Games with perception

• In game theoretical model players are often modeled as blind players.
• The perception of the opponent matters.
• Bayesian games with beliefs based on perception.
• Existence of discriminatory equilibria where players act differently depending on the perception of the opponent.
• Taxonomy of the beliefs induced by different characteristics (emotions or personality traits).

We are interested in 2×22×2 game situations where players act depending on how they perceive their counterpart although this choice is payoff irrelevant. Perceptions concern a dichotomous characteristic. The model includes uncertainty as players know how they perceive their counterpart, but not how they are perceived. We study whether the mere possibility of playing differently depending on the counterpart’s perception generates new equilibria. We analyze equilibria in which strategies are contingent on perception. We show that the existence of this discriminatory equilibrium depends on the characteristic in question and on the class of game.