کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
354409 | 1434837 | 2012 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
We study student loan behavior in the Netherlands where (i) higher education students know little about the conditions of the government's financial aid program and (ii) take-up rates are low. In a field experiment we manipulated the amount of information students have about these conditions. The treatment has no impact on loan take-up, which is not due to students already having decided to take a loan or students not absorbing the information. We conclude that a lack of knowledge about specific policy parameters does not necessarily imply a binding information constraint.
► We study student loan behavior in the Netherlands.
► There is a strong positive correlation between knowledge of loan conditions and take-up.
► We show that this correlation does not reflect a causal link from knowledge to take-up.
Journal: Economics of Education Review - Volume 31, Issue 1, February 2012, Pages 33–44