Symbolic protocol analysis for monoidal equational theories

We are interested in the design of automated procedures for analyzing the (in)security of cryptographic protocols in the Dolev–Yao model for a bounded number of sessions when we take into account some algebraic properties satisfied by the operators involved in the protocol. This leads to a more realistic model in comparison to what we get under the perfect cryptography assumption, but it implies that protocol analysis deals with terms modulo some equational theory instead of terms in a free algebra. The main goal of this paper is to setup a general approach that works for a whole class of monoidal theories which contains many of the specific cases that have been considered so far in an ad-hoc way (e.g. exclusive or, Abelian groups, exclusive or in combination with the homomorphism axiom). We follow a classical schema for cryptographic protocol analysis which proves first a locality result and then reduces the insecurity problem to a symbolic constraint solving problem. This approach strongly relies on the correspondence between a monoidal theory E and a semiring SE which we use to deal with the symbolic constraints. We show that the well-defined symbolic constraints that are generated by reasonable protocols can be solved provided that unification in the monoidal theory satisfies some additional properties. The resolution process boils down to solving particular quadratic Diophantine equations that are reduced to linear Diophantine equations, thanks to linear algebra results and the well-definedness of the problem. Examples of theories that do not satisfy our additional properties appear to be undecidable, which suggests that our characterization is reasonably tight.