کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
4372738 | 1303076 | 2009 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Commons and anticommons in a simple renewable resource harvest model
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری
علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک
بوم شناسی، تکامل، رفتار و سامانه شناسی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Commons and anticommons in a simple renewable resource harvest model Commons and anticommons in a simple renewable resource harvest model](/preview/png/4372738.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider a model where agents harvesting from a renewable resource can impose limitations on the harvesting efforts of other agents. Obstructing the harvesting of others comes at a cost, and is viewed as regulation of resource access. Thus, the agent population comprises agents that do not obstruct (“cooperators”) and agents that obstruct (“obstructors”). As the economically better performing strategy spreads in the population, the system self-organizes at a level of obstruction which depends on the costs of obstruction, the obstruction efficiency and the history of the system. We show that commons and anticommons can be considered as the end points of a continuum of varying degrees of obstruction and we identify three regimes for the stationary state of the evolution dynamics: (i) a state where the system ends up in a tragedy of the commons, (ii) a tragedy of the anticommons state and (iii) a moderately regulated state in between both extremes. The more a policy environment in the moderately regulated state is tuned for optimality, the higher the danger that a fluctuation destabilizes the system into severe overexploitation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Ecological Complexity - Volume 6, Issue 1, March 2009, Pages 56-63
Journal: Ecological Complexity - Volume 6, Issue 1, March 2009, Pages 56-63
نویسندگان
M. Brede, Fabio Boschetti,