کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
455180 695347 2008 5 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Cryptanalysis of e-mail protocols providing perfect forward secrecy
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه مهندسی کامپیوتر شبکه های کامپیوتری و ارتباطات
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Cryptanalysis of e-mail protocols providing perfect forward secrecy
چکیده انگلیسی

Recently, two e-mail protocols were proposed claiming to provide perfect secrecy. These protocols use authentication and (Diffie-Hellman) key-exchange techniques, and as such, other standard security criteria besides perfect forward secrecy include key-replay resilience, known-key security, key freshness and unknown key-share resilience are expected too. In this paper, we show that the two protocols cannot resist replay attacks, and further that the first falls to unknown key-share attacks while the second fails to provide perfect forward secrecy, contrary to the designers' claims. Although the two protocols were intended by the designers to be more secure variants compared to the common e-mail protocol, our results show that being newer does not necessarily mean being more secure.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Computer Standards & Interfaces - Volume 30, Issue 3, March 2008, Pages 101–105
نویسندگان
,