On improving the efficiency of truthful routing in MANETs with selfish nodes

In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), nodes depend upon each other for routing and forwarding packets. However, nodes belonging to independent authorities in MANETs may behave selfishly and may not forward packets to save battery and other resources. To stimulate cooperation, nodes are rewarded for their forwarding service. Since nodes spend different cost to forward packets, it is desirable to reimburse nodes according to their cost so that nodes get incentive while the least total payment is charged to the sender. However, to maximize their utility, nodes may tell lie about their cost. This poses the requirement of truthful protocols, which maximizes the utility of nodes only when they declare their true cost. Anderegg and Eidenbenz recently proposed a truthful routing protocol, named ad hoc-VCG. This protocol incurs the route discovery overhead of O(n3)O(n3), where nn is the number of nodes in the network. This routing overhead is likely to become prohibitively large as the network size grows. Moreover, it leads to low network performance due to congestion and interference. We present a low-overhead truthful routing protocol for route discovery in MANETs with selfish nodes by applying mechanism design. The protocol, named LOTTO   (Low Overhead Truthful rouTing prOtocol), finds a least cost path for data forwarding with a lower routing overhead of O(n2)O(n2). We conduct an extensive simulation study to evaluate the performance of our protocol and compare it with ad hoc-VCG. Simulation results show that our protocol provides a much higher packet delivery ratio, generates much lower overhead and has much lower end-to-end delay.