کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
477351 | 1446153 | 2009 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Stationary perfect equilibria of an n-person noncooperative bargaining game and cooperative solution concepts Stationary perfect equilibria of an n-person noncooperative bargaining game and cooperative solution concepts](/preview/png/477351.png)
This paper characterizes the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of an n-person noncooperative bargaining model with characteristic functions, and provides strategic foundations of some cooperative solution concepts such as the core, the bargaining set and the kernel. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we show that a linear programming formulation successfully characterizes the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of our bargaining game. We suggest a linear programming formulation as an algorithm for the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of a class of n-person noncooperative games. Second, utilizing the linear programming formulation, we show that stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of n-person noncooperative games provide strategic foundations for the bargaining set and the kernel.
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 194, Issue 3, 1 May 2009, Pages 922–932