On sequential commitment in the price-dependent newsvendor model

We investigate the effect of sequential commitment in the decentralized newsvendor model with price-dependent demand. Sequential commitment allows the self-profit maximizing parties to commit to contract parameters (e.g., wholesale price, retail price, buyback price and order quantity) sequentially and alternately, and we investigate its effect on the equilibrium profits of the channel and its members. Sequential commitment introduces more flexibility to contracting in the supply chain and our analysis can provide some insight to channel members who follow a bargaining process to determine the values of contract parameters. We show that the introduction of sequential commitment to the price-dependent (PD) newsvendor model with buybacks can significantly improve the manufacturer’s and the channel expected profits, but it can also decrease the retailer’s expected profit. Finally, we demonstrate that with sequential commitment, under some conditions, the choice of the first mover is endogenized and we identify the unique sequence of commitments by channel members that would arise in equilibrium.