کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
478716 | 1446132 | 2010 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms
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موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
مهندسی کامپیوتر
علوم کامپیوتر (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
In the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems, we present a bargaining mechanism for connecting all agents to the source and dividing the cost among them. The basic idea is very simple: we ask each agent the part of the cost he is willing to pay for an arc to be constructed. We prove that there exists a unique payoff allocation associated with the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this bargaining mechanism. Moreover, this payoff allocation coincides with the rule defined in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga [Bergantiños, G., Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2007a. A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Journal of Economic Theory 137, 326–352].
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 201, Issue 3, 16 March 2010, Pages 811–820
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 201, Issue 3, 16 March 2010, Pages 811–820
نویسندگان
Gustavo Bergantiños, Juan Vidal-Puga,