کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
480135 | 1446064 | 2013 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Contingent payment auction mechanism in multidimensional procurement auctions Contingent payment auction mechanism in multidimensional procurement auctions](/preview/png/480135.png)
This paper considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several suppliers who hold private information about their own efficiency type. Both quality and price need to be determined. Different from scoring auctions, we present a new method, i.e., contingent payment auction mechanism (CPAM), which can effectively deal with the optimal procurement strategy in multidimensional procurement auctions. CPAM can implement the optimal mechanism for the buyer and is thus optimal among all possible procurement strategies. CPAM implies that the buyer should first design and announce a contingent payment function that specifies a payment for each possible quality level before the bidding begins. Compared to scoring auctions, CPAM has some advantages. It does not require a special form of scoring rule and can be generalized in a more broad auction formats. Furthermore, it can help us to solve the ex post moral hazard problem. We consider two kinds of CPAM. For the CPAM I is sensitive to different auction formats, we come up with CPAM II which can improve the performance of CPAM I. Broadly speaking, CPAM integrates the idea of dimension reduction from scoring auction into that of incentive contract design from contract theory to solve the problem of ex post moral hazard.
► We find a new method (CPAM) to effectively deal with the optimal procurement strategy in multidimensional auctions.
► CPAM can implement the optimal mechanism.
► CPAM has some comparative advantages over scoring auction mechanism.
► CPAM cannot only solve the adverse selection problem, but also can effectively lessen the risk of moral hazard.
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 224, Issue 2, 16 January 2013, Pages 404–413