کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
481551 | 1446099 | 2011 | 6 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
A matrix A defines an assignment market, where each row represents a buyer and each column a seller. If buyer i is matched with seller j, the market produces aij units of utility. Quint (1991) points out that usually many different assignment matrices exist that define markets with the same core and poses the question of when the matrix is uniquely determined by the core of the related market. We characterize these matrices in terms of a strong form of the doubly dominant diagonal property. A matching between buyers and sellers is optimal if it produces the maximum units of utility. Our characterization allows us to show that the number of optimal matchings in markets uniquely characterized by their core is a power of two.
► We analyze assignment matrices that uniquely determine the core of the market.
► The characterizing property is a strong form of doubly dominant diagonal.
► For these matrices the number of optimal matchings is a power of two.
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 212, Issue 3, 1 August 2011, Pages 529–534