The Analysis of Peasant Households’ Collective Brand Maintenance Behavior in the “One Village, One Product” Program of China

The “one village, one product” program establishes an important pattern of agricultural economy specialization and formalization in China. The brand is the external performance of organizational reputation. Key to the sustainable development of the program lies in whether all the peasant households maintain brand is. This paper focuses on an evolutionary game model, which reveals the peasant households’ behavior features of brand maintenance. It is found that the peasant households’ behavior evolved result would create the low efficiency of collective brand maintenance if they do not treasure personal reputation. It is proposed that the agricultural cooperation organizations should become the carriers of the “one village, one product” program. The peasant households will treasure personal reputation in the agricultural cooperation organizations, so the interaction between the personal reputation and organizational reputation could drive the peasant households to maintain collective brand spontaneously. Finally, an actual case is illustrated to support the model.