کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
4942391 1437248 2017 21 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
How Otto did not extend his mind, but might have: Dynamic systems theory and social-cultural group selection
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
چگونه اتو ذهن خود را گسترش داد، اما ممکن است: تئوری سیستم های پویا و انتخاب گروه اجتماعی و فرهنگی
کلمات کلیدی
اشتباهات قانون اساسی، انتخاب گروه فرهنگی، شناخت توزیع شده، تئوری سیستم های دینامیکی، شناخت گسترش یافته: شناخت شناختی،
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه مهندسی کامپیوتر هوش مصنوعی
چکیده انگلیسی
Proponents of cognitive Situationism argue that the human mind is embodied, embedded in both natural and social-cultural environments and extended creating both extended and distributed cognition. Anti-situationists reject all or some of these claims. I argue that four major objections to extended cognition: (1) the mark of the cognitive, (2) the function-identity fallacy, (3) cognitive bloat, and (4) scientific irrelevance lose much of their sting in the case of distributed cognition, the extension of cognitive agency to a group of cognitive agents, such as a scientific research team. However, I claim that a crucial fifth challenge, that advocates of the extended mind commit the causal-constitution fallacy, has yet to be satisfactorily addressed. I focus on Spyridon Palermos' use of dynamic systems theory to refute this charge and I argue that his appeal to dynamic systems theory as a way of understanding system-constitution fails. Instead, I suggest a social-cultural group selection hypothesis for understanding system-constitution. But, I leave it for another day to elaborate that hypothesis' empirical plausibility.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Cognitive Systems Research - Volume 45, October 2017, Pages 124-144
نویسندگان
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