کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5034139 | 1471547 | 2017 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: Experimental evidence
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
مزایده ارزش مشترک دوم با عدم اطمینان، اطلاعات خصوصی و عمومی: شواهد تجربی
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We conduct a laboratory experiment of second-price sealed bid auctions of a common value good with two bidders. Bidders face three different types of information: common uncertainty (unknown information), private information (known by one bidder) and public information (known by both bidders), and auctions differ on the relative importance of these three types of information. We find that subjects barely differentiate between private and public information and deviate from the theoretical predictions with respect to all three types of information. There is under-reaction to both private and public information and systematic overbidding in all auctions above and beyond the standard winner's curse. The Cursed Equilibrium and Level-k models successfully account for some features of the data but others remain largely unexplained.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics - Volume 67, April 2017, Pages 28-40
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics - Volume 67, April 2017, Pages 28-40
نویسندگان
Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo, Manuel Castro,