کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5034573 1471630 2017 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Reducing crime through expungements
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
کاهش جرم از طریق محرومیت
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی


- A law enforcement model is studied where first time offenders can expunge their records at a cost chosen by the government.
- High criminal tendency offenders refrain from expunging their records and low criminal tendency offenders expunge their records.
- Expungements increase specific deterrence by increasing the cost to re-offending to ex-convicts with expunged records.
- There exists a range of expungement costs that reduce crime relative to a regime where there are no expungments.

Expungement refers to the legal practice of having one's criminal record sealed. These legal devices lower the visibility of a person's criminal record, and thereby reduce the informal sanctions that may be imposed on him. This reduction is enjoyed by the ex-convict only if he does not become a repeat offender, because otherwise he re-obtains a criminal record. Thus, the value a person attaches to having his record expunged is inversely related to his criminal tendency. Therefore, by making expungements costly, the criminal justice system can sort out low criminal tendency individuals - who are unlikely to recidivate - from people who have high criminal tendencies. Moreover, the availability of expungements does not substantially affect a first time offender's incentive to commit crime, because one incurs a cost close to the reduction in informal sanctions that he enjoys by sealing his criminal record. On the other hand, expungements increase specific deterrence, because a person who has no visible record suffers informal sanctions if he is convicted a second time. Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, allowing ex-convicts to seal their records at substantial costs reduces crime.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 137, May 2017, Pages 398-409
نویسندگان
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