کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5034587 1471632 2017 19 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The logic of costly punishment reversed: Expropriation of free-riders and outsiders
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
The logic of costly punishment reversed: Expropriation of free-riders and outsiders
چکیده انگلیسی


- Coordinated punishment can be profitable to the punishers, rather than costly.
- The power to punish may be abused to expropriate people.
- In heterogenous societies, minorities rather than free-riders may be expropriated.
- We show this in real world examples and a laboratory experiment.

Current literature views the punishment of free-riders as an under-supplied public good, carried out by individuals at a cost to themselves. It need not be so: often, free-riders' property can be forcibly appropriated by a coordinated group. This power makes punishment profitable, but it can also be abused. It is easier to contain abuses, and focus group punishment on free-riders, in societies where coordinated expropriation is harder. Our theory explains why public goods are undersupplied in heterogenous communities: because groups target minorities instead of free-riders. In our laboratory experiment, outcomes were more efficient when coordination was more difficult, while outgroup members were targeted more than ingroup members, and reacted differently to punishment.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 135, March 2017, Pages 112-130
نویسندگان
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