کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5034612 1471634 2017 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The hidden perils of affirmative action: Sabotage in handicap contests
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
The hidden perils of affirmative action: Sabotage in handicap contests
چکیده انگلیسی


- We study standard contests, and contests with affirmative action (AA).
- Prior research has found that effort levels are higher in contests with AA.
- We find that sabotage, destructive effort, is also higher in contests with AA.
- We verify this prediction using a unique data-set from UK horse racing.

Contests are ubiquitous in economic, organizational and political settings. Contest designers often use tools to make a contest among asymmetric contestants more even, in order to either elicit higher effort levels, or for ethical reasons. Handicapping - in which stronger participants are a priori weakened - is one successful tool that is widely used in sports, promotional tournaments and procurement auctions. In this study we show theoretically that participants may also increase their destructive effort, and sabotage their rivals' performance, when handicapping is employed. We empirically verify this prediction using data on 19,635 U.K. horse-races in 2011 and 2012. Our results suggest that while a level field may be conducive to heightened positive effort in general, in a setting where both handicapping and sabotage are present it also lays the ground for greater destruction.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 133, January 2017, Pages 273-284
نویسندگان
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