کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5066338 1476773 2017 24 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Managing innovation: Optimal incentive contracts for delegated R&D with double moral hazard
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
مدیریت نوآوری: قراردادهای مشوق مطلوب برای تحویل تحقیق و توسعه با خطر اخلاقی دوگانه
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی

Managing innovation involves double moral hazard because the principal delegates R&D to a specialized agent and then makes decisions to apply the resulting invention. Double moral hazard is significant because innovation by the principal implies that the optimal incentive contract satisfies monotonicity conditions. The analysis shows that the optimal incentive contract for delegated R&D is an option. Delegated R&D with simultaneous sampling results in shirking but delegated R&D with sequential sampling attains the efficient outcome. The analysis considers a combined problem with simultaneous and sequential search and gives sufficient conditions under which delegated R&D attains the first best. The discussion also considers delegated R&D with stochastic innovation and with stochastic quality of inventions.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 95, June 2017, Pages 38-61
نویسندگان
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