کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5066678 | 1476792 | 2015 | 22 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Sunk capital, unions and the hold-up problem: Theory and evidence from cross-country sectoral data
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
سرمایه ناپاک، اتحادیه ها و مشکل مانع: نظریه و شواهد از داده های بخش های مختلف کشور
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper we study the hold-up problem by considering the effect of union bargaining power on the level of investment per worker across sectors characterised by different levels of sunk capital investment. We develop a search and matching model with heterogeneous sectors and ex-post collective wage bargaining and test the predictions of the model using a difference-in-difference approach on manufacturing sector data in a set of OECD countries during the period 1980-2000. We find that union power reduces investment per worker particularly in sunk capital intensive industries. We refine our empirical analysis showing that the underlying hold-up problem is exacerbated when strikes are not regulated after a collective contract is signed and there is no arbitration, while the presence of social pacts may sustain cooperative equilibria that alleviate the hold-up problem. Our results are robust to a series of controls and possible endogeneity of union power.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 76, May 2015, Pages 253-274
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 76, May 2015, Pages 253-274
نویسندگان
Gabriele Cardullo, Maurizio Conti, Giovanni Sulis,