کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5066836 | 1476800 | 2014 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
تولید تیم در بازار کار رقابتی با انتخاب نامناسب
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team׳s performance and therefore on their colleagues׳ productivity. We study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers have private information on their productivity. We find that in any competitive equilibrium there must be Pareto-efficient separation of workers according to their productivity. We further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, where under a particular condition on workers׳ indifference curves even arbitrarily small externalities guarantee equilibrium existence.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 68, May 2014, Pages 181-198
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 68, May 2014, Pages 181-198
نویسندگان
Ferdinand A. von Siemens, Michael Kosfeld,