Divided government versus incumbency externality effect-Quasi-experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions

- We study the interdependency between outcomes of mayor and council elections in Germany.
- The incumbent mayor's party only benefits in simultaneous local elections.
- This points towards an incumbency externality effect.
- Voters punish mayor candidates of parties that performed well in past council elections.
- This underlines a preference for divided government among voters.

This paper explores the causal relationship between vote outcomes in different elections. We ask: (1) Does the partisan identity of the mayor influence the voter's decision in subsequent town council elections? (2) Do voters condition their vote for the mayor on the result of the last council election? The analysis mainProd. Type: FLPly relies on a regression discontinuity design focusing on close election outcomes based on municipal level data for Germany. We find that the party of the mayor can receive a significant bonus in the next town council election. Moreover, voters punish mayor candidates of parties that performed strongly in earlier council elections. Throughout the paper, we highlight how these findings can be related to an incumbency externality effect and to the theory of divided government.