کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5067010 | 1476809 | 2013 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
We construct a tractable model of an oligopolistic industry that allows us to capture the role of the vertical structure in the incentives for and implications of cross-border horizontal mergers. We show that vertical integration can increase the gains from cross-border mergers. We also demonstrate how market concentration interacts with costs in the decision of a relatively efficient foreign firm located in one country (source) to merge with a disintegrated or an integrated firm in another country (target) when the industry is vertically related. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we demonstrate that vertical integration can raise the incentives for diversification in production and add to the gains from cross-border horizontal mergers. Any additional gain from cross-border horizontal mergers, due to the existence of a vertically integrated production structure, is shown to be sensitive to the relative market concentration across countries. Cross-border mergers will be triggered by a relatively cost-efficient source taking over a disintegrated target when pre-merger competition among the disintegrated firms is relatively intense but, otherwise, the initial target will be a vertically integrated firm.
⺠We build a vertical model of an oligopolistic industry. ⺠Vertical integration increases the incentives for diversification in production. ⺠Vertical integration raises the gains from cross-border mergers. ⺠Cross-border mergers have variable impacts on the extensive margins of trade. ⺠Market concentration and costs interact for cross-border mergers.
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 59, April 2013, Pages 97-108