کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5067152 1372571 2011 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Endogenous market structures and contract theory: Delegation, principal-agent contracts, screening, franchising and tying
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Endogenous market structures and contract theory: Delegation, principal-agent contracts, screening, franchising and tying
چکیده انگلیسی

I study the role of unilateral strategic contracts for firms active in markets with price competition and endogenous entry. Traditional results change substantially when the market structure is endogenous rather than exogenous. They concern (1) contracts of managerial delegation to non-profit maximizers, (2) incentive principal-agent contracts in the presence of moral hazard on cost-reducing activities, (3) screening contracts in case of asymmetric information on the productivity of the managers, (4) vertical contracts of franchising in case of hold-up problems and (5) tying contracts by monopolists competing also in secondary markets. Firms use always these contracts to strengthen price competition and manage to obtain positive profits in spite of free entry.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 55, Issue 4, May 2011, Pages 463-479
نویسندگان
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