کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5067519 | 1372601 | 2006 | 23 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Debt, managerial compensation and learning
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Using a dynamic model with uncertainty and asymmetric information, we study the impact of debt and bankruptcy on managerial compensation and learning. In this model, compensation has two roles to play-providing incentives to the manager and learning about his type. We show that debt, through bankruptcy, acts as a substitute of compensation in both dimensions and derive conditions under which debt lowers average compensation, pay-performance sensitivity and increases learning. We also examine the choice of debt and show that firm value can be increased due to debt's effect on managerial compensation, abstracting from other costs and benefits of debt. Finally, we conduct comparative statics with respect to the underlying parameters.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 50, Issue 2, February 2006, Pages 377-399
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 50, Issue 2, February 2006, Pages 377-399
نویسندگان
Neelam Jain,