کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5069429 1476989 2015 7 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Unique equilibrium in a model of takeovers involving block trades and tender offers
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Unique equilibrium in a model of takeovers involving block trades and tender offers
چکیده انگلیسی
Small shareholders face coordination problems during takeovers. Without common knowledge of a bidder's negotiation ability with an incumbent blockholder in support of a takeover, the probability of takeover success is uniquely determined if the private information available to small shareholders regarding the bidder's negotiation ability is precise enough. An analysis of the unique equilibrium demonstrates that the earmarked freeze-out amount and the expected amount of abnormal returns affect the takeover's outcome. Moreover, the effect of the blockholder's size on the takeover's outcome is determined by the relative size of the earmarked freeze-out amount and the expected amount of abnormal returns.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Finance Research Letters - Volume 15, November 2015, Pages 208-214
نویسندگان
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