کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5069909 | 1373216 | 2006 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
On the sequencing of projects, reputation building, and relationship finance
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We study the decision an entrepreneur faces in financing multiple projects and show that relationship financing will arise endogenously in an environment where strategic defaults are likely, even when firms have access to arm's-length financing. Relationship financing allows an entrepreneur to build a private reputation for repayment that reduces the cost of financing. However, in an environment where the risk of strategic default is low, the benefits from reputation building are outweighed by holdup rents extractable by the incumbent lender. Entrepreneurs then choose to finance projects from single or multiple, arm's-length lenders. We relate these findings to studies that positively associate accounting standards, creditor rights, and legal enforcement with economic growth.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Finance Research Letters - Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 23-39
Journal: Finance Research Letters - Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 23-39
نویسندگان
Dominik Egli, Steven Ongena, David C. Smith,