کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5075690 1477179 2015 8 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
An insurance contract with a low compensation period under adverse selection
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
قرارداد بیمه با دوره جبران کم تحت انتخاب نامناسب
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری مدیریت فناوری و نوآوری
چکیده انگلیسی


- We design an insurance contract with a low compensation period and subsidies.
- The low compensation period can help distinguish the risk types of individuals.
- Our contract weakly dominates the traditional partial insurance contract.
- When it comes to the separating equilibrium, the low-risk policyholders can obtain higher utility from our contract.

Adverse selection has a significant influence on trading efficiency in insurance markets. Inspired by the quality identification function of the probation period in the secondhand car market, an insurance contract with a low compensation period is designed. It is proved that the contract can distinguish the risk types of the policyholders to achieve a separating equilibrium. And it can make a strict Pareto improvement to the traditional partial insurance contract under certain conditions. Finally, an example is given to demonstrate the conclusions.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Information Economics and Policy - Volume 31, June 2015, Pages 67-74
نویسندگان
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