کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5075916 | 1373991 | 2009 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Vertical integration, bundled discounts and welfare
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
مدیریت فناوری و نوآوری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله

چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies firms' incentives for vertical integration and bundled discounts of complementary components. We assume that firms first choose ownership structures and pricing schemes, and then compete on price. We find that vertical integration and mixed bundling is a dominant strategy for all firms, while, except for systems of components that are highly differentiated, total surplus is maximized under independent ownership with bundled discounts. Thus, our model suggests that vertical separation is beneficial for both firms and consumers in such a situation of competitive bundling. Our results have important policy implications for broadband markets.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Information Economics and Policy - Volume 21, Issue 1, February 2009, Pages 62-71
Journal: Information Economics and Policy - Volume 21, Issue 1, February 2009, Pages 62-71
نویسندگان
Masayoshi Maruyama, Kazumitsu Minamikawa,