کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5075981 | 1373996 | 2010 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Access regulation under asymmetric information about the entrant's efficiency
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
مدیریت فناوری و نوآوری
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چکیده انگلیسی
We study the impact of access regulation on an entrant's decision whether to invest in a telecommunications network or to ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its efficiency level. We show that an efficient entrant may have incentives to target low demand after entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in the future. Therefore, the regulator must set access prices, contingent on demand, which penalize the inefficient entrant. We further show that, although linear prices are not always sufficient to promote the investment of an efficient entrant without introducing distortions, two-part tariffs already allow the regulator to achieve this objective.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Information Economics and Policy - Volume 22, Issue 2, May 2010, Pages 192-199
Journal: Information Economics and Policy - Volume 22, Issue 2, May 2010, Pages 192-199
نویسندگان
João Vareda,