کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5084417 | 1477901 | 2017 | 38 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Do institutional investors reinforce or reduce agency problems? Earnings management and the post-IPO performance
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This study investigates the dual roles of institutional investors in earnings management during initial public offerings (IPOs). Research suggests that institutional investors play a monitoring role in the corporate governance of firms by mitigating earnings management to reduce agency problems. However, institutional investors have incentives to opportunistically maximize their wealth by manipulating earnings when firms engage in IPOs. Results suggest that institutional investors facilitate accrual-based earnings management before IPOs but restrain earnings management after their issuance. We also find that firms with high institutional ownership experience superior post-IPO stock returns and operating performance, thereby suggesting that the capital market positively prices the monitoring function of institutional investors after IPOs, and the performance of these firms is improved. Our results are robust to controlling the endogeneity problem of institutional investors and further identifying active institutional investors.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Financial Analysis - Volume 52, July 2017, Pages 62-76
Journal: International Review of Financial Analysis - Volume 52, July 2017, Pages 62-76
نویسندگان
Huai-Chun Lo, Ruei-Shian Wu, Qian Long Kweh,