کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5084445 | 1477904 | 2017 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Controlling shareholders and market timing: Evidence from cross-listing events
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
سهامداران کنترل و زمان بندی بازار: شواهد از رویدادهای لیست متقابل
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We find partial support for a permanent increase in firm value following U.S. cross-listings. Cross-listed firms with capital-raising intentions on U.S. exchanges and firms cross-listing after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act exhibit an increase in firm value. Yet, investors are worse off in the long run when owning insider-controlled cross-listings. Compared to non-insider-owned cross-listings, insider-owned firms have a greater rise in value around the cross-listing year but also a larger decline in the post-cross-listing years. In fact, insider-owned firms lose value by the fifth year, compared with their value before cross-listing. Lastly, we show that liquidity and visibility enhance the value of cross-listings.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Financial Analysis - Volume 49, January 2017, Pages 12-23
Journal: International Review of Financial Analysis - Volume 49, January 2017, Pages 12-23
نویسندگان
Omar A. Esqueda,