کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5085543 | 1478056 | 2015 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Deterrence effects under Twombly: On the costs of increasing pleading standards in litigation
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We develop a game theoretic model of litigant behavior to study the effects of increased pleading standards on incentives to engage in illegal activity. Such a model is necessary to build intuition about the potential costs of the procedures set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (550 U.S. 544 [2007]) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (556 U.S. 662, 684 [2009]), which increase the standard of plausibility that lawsuits must meet before being allowed to proceed to discovery and trial. We show how increasing pleading standards tends to increase illegal activity, and can increase litigation costs. Our results provide a counterpoint to the U.S. Supreme Court's argument that increased plausibility requirements decrease the costs of litigation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 44, October 2015, Pages 61-71
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 44, October 2015, Pages 61-71
نویسندگان
Sergio J. Campos, Christopher S. Cotton, Cheng Li,