کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5085752 1478072 2012 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Explaining uniformity in rule design: The role of citizen participation in enforcement
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Explaining uniformity in rule design: The role of citizen participation in enforcement
چکیده انگلیسی

Uniform rules incur high aggregate compliance costs when agents are sufficiently heterogeneous. Despite this, uniformity remains a common feature in regulation. Focusing on the monitoring stage of enforcement, this paper highlights an underappreciated benefit of uniform rules. Uniformity of regulation can enhance the productivity of monitoring. We illustrate the general mechanism by showing that in the presence of members of the public that are willing and able to report violations to the regulator at a cost to themselves, uniform rules allow substituting third-party participation for costly own monitoring. However, socially desirable acts may have to be punished to generate deterrence for undesirable acts. Individualizing monitoring and enforcement and citizens acting on welfare considerations do not improve on the outcome.

► The paper highlights an underappreciated benefit of uniformity in regulation. ► Motivated citizens can participate in the monitoring of agents. ► Subjecting all agents to the same rule makes detection of violations easier for citizens. ► The reduced monitoring costs for the regulator can outweigh the losses from uniformity. ► Individualized enforcement and welfare-oriented citizens do not improve on the outcome.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 32, Issue 1, March 2012, Pages 166-177
نویسندگان
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