کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5085773 | 1478067 | 2013 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
This article focuses on the mutual interplay between changes in divorce rates, divorce laws and cultural acceptance of divorce. The latter differs among individuals and evolves endogenously via cultural transmission mechanisms in which children's preferences are partly shaped by divorce decisions of their parents. In turn, divorce law is chosen by majority voting. The dynamics of the economy may exhibit multiple long-run equilibria. Economic shocks can destabilize the low-divorce equilibrium: through cultural evolutions, divorce rates increase and divorce law may be modified. In compliance with stylized facts, the results show that legal changes occurred after that divorce rates had started to rise.
⺠Divorce laws are chosen through majority voting. ⺠Attitudes toward divorce evolve through cultural transmission mechanisms. ⺠A conservative equilibrium may coexist with a liberal equilibrium. ⺠Economic shocks may induce an equilibrium change. ⺠During the transition, the rise in divorce rates precedes legal changes.
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 34, June 2013, Pages 77-87