The costs of avoiding accidents: Selective compliance and the 'Peltzman effect' in Italy

We empirically investigate the deterrent and offsetting effects of the introduction of a point-record driving license (PDRL) in Italy. We find that the PDRL resulted in a sharp reduction of seat belt offenses, and in a noticeable decrease of road accidents. However, the reduction in occupant fatalities and injuries was associated with an increase in non-occupant ones, suggesting a remarkable “Peltzman effect”. We then discuss whether a given enforcement design, by inducing drivers to make the best use of safety resources already available to them, may generate more external costs than would otherwise occur.

► The introduction of PRDL system in Italy resulted to play a deterrent role on drivers' behavior. ► Such deterrent effect has been however 'selective' in Italy, increasing use of seat belt, leaving almost unaffected other driving behaviors. ► PRDL, whereas reducing fatalities on the aggregate, has nonetheless generated additional fatalities (for non-occupants), as the result of offsetting behavior.