کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5085853 | 1478088 | 2008 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Heterogeneous physicians, lawsuit costs, and the negligence rule
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Heterogeneous physicians, lawsuit costs, and the negligence rule Heterogeneous physicians, lawsuit costs, and the negligence rule](/preview/png/5085853.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
Real-world observations of negligent and defensive medicine challenge malpractice liability. Based on a principal-agent model with two types of physicians I show that lawsuit costs affect the patients' decision to sue and the physicians' level of care under the negligence rule, leading to a separated equilibrium in care. Given these conditions, punitive damages allow for a pooled equilibrium where all physicians exert first-best care. If courts cannot use punitive damages, a second-best solution arises with an optimal negligence standard that deviates from first-best care.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 28, Issue 1, March 2008, Pages 78-88
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 28, Issue 1, March 2008, Pages 78-88
نویسندگان
Anja Olbrich,