کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5085927 | 1478091 | 2007 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Property division on divorce with inequity aversion
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
In the absence of transaction costs, the divorce decision is invariant to legal rules on post-divorce asset allocation. This article introduces a one-sided inequity aversion model to show that property division laws can have efficiency as well as distributive consequences. When divorce is a credible threat, aversion to inequity may prevent spouses renegotiating their marriage to avoid an inefficient marital dissolution. Contemporary trends towards greater equality in property division can be interpreted in terms of their beneficial efficiency effects in addition to standard distributive concerns.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 27, Issue 2, June 2007, Pages 111-128
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 27, Issue 2, June 2007, Pages 111-128
نویسندگان
Ian Smith,