کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5085930 1478091 2007 9 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders
چکیده انگلیسی

Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. Even if an agent is law abiding, she may still commit the act accidentally. The agents are wealth constrained. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. If the benefit from the crime is small, the optimal sanction scheme is decreasing in the number of offenses. By contrast, if the benefit is large, sanctions are increasing in the number of offenses. Increasing sanctions do not make the criminal track less attractive; they make being honest more attractive.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 27, Issue 2, June 2007, Pages 170-178
نویسندگان
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