کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5085974 | 1478084 | 2009 | 5 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Plea bargaining with budgetary constraints
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper, we construct a simple model that illustrates a perverse effect associated with plea bargaining in which an increase in sanctions can lead to reduced deterrence. This finding is derived from the interaction of binding budgetary constraints and plea bargaining. In an environment with these institutional features, higher sanctions are not always optimal when resources are limited, even if such sanctions are costless. Such potential phenomena may be useful in explaining the fact that many states have introduced limitations on plea bargaining. Prosecutors being concerned with their conviction rates is necessary for such a result to be present.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 29, Issue 1, March 2009, Pages 8-12
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 29, Issue 1, March 2009, Pages 8-12
نویسندگان
Steeve Mongrain, Joanne Roberts,