کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5086024 1478095 2006 15 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Conditional versus contingent fees: Litigation expenditure incentives
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Conditional versus contingent fees: Litigation expenditure incentives
چکیده انگلیسی

Many jurisdictions in the UK and Australia now allow conditional fees to be struck between a lawyer and their client. While both conditional and contingent fees are outcome-contingent, only under the former is the lawyer's remuneration a function of inputs. The public policy arguments put forward for each fee structure hinge importantly on litigation expenditure incentives. We show that conditional (contingent) fees are not better suited to the English (American) rule of fee-shifting. We also show that whether conditional fees result in higher or lower expenditure than contingent fees depends crucially on whether the inputs to litigation are determined by the lawyer or the client. If the latter, then conditional fees result in (weakly) lower expenditure than contingent fees. If the lawyer determines inputs then expenditure is higher under conditional fees.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 26, Issue 2, June 2006, Pages 180-194
نویسندگان
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