Challenges for New Zealand's individual transferable quota system: Processor consolidation, fisher exclusion, & Māori quota rights

• Māori groups’ attempts to manage quota for small-scale fishers’ economic development face structural limitations.
• ITQ system monitoring regulations restrict market access, even for fishers with access to quota.
• Annual Catch Entitlement trading subverts quota-consolidation limits, facilitating processor consolidation.
• Licensed Fish Receiver certification requirements maintain processor control of markets.

This paper identifies three management initiatives in New Zealand's Individual Transferable Quota system that facilitated consolidation of the processing sector and limited market access for fishers, even those with quota rights. They are: (1) the placement of responsibility onto a Māori trust in 1992 and tribes (iwi) in 2004 to manage a limited amount of quota to benefit all Māori, fishers and non-fishers, which increased the use of quota as an investment asset; (2) the creation of Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) as a fish access right separate from the quota ownership right, which made it possible to overcome consolidation limits by leasing ACE; (3) the 1997 Licensed Fish Receiver Act that made it illegal for fishers to sell fish off the boat without food safety certification. This account of the fishery policy environment in New Zealand explains why, despite owning significant portions of New Zealand's fishing quota, few Māori are fishing, processing, or selling fish caught by Māori quota.