A NAASTy alternative to RAND pricing commitments

Voluntary standard setting organizations (SSOs) typically require participants to disclose their patents during the standard-setting process, and will endorse a standard only if patent holders commit to license them on reasonable and non-discriminatory or RAND terms. This policy is unworkable—the RAND standard is ambiguous and thus extremely hard to adjudicate. As an alternative, a policy of Non-Assertion After Specified Time, or NAAST pricing, is proposed. Under NAAST, technology vendors commit not to assert their patent after some previous specified time, but would be free to collect royalties as they wish up until that point. Under this proposal, technology producers would be compensated, vendors would have quick and eventually free access to standards and a large element of uncertainty due to litigation would be eliminated.

► RAND license commitments give courts little guidance on how to adjudicate a reasonable royalty.
► We propose an alternative: Non-Assertion After Specified Time (NAAST).
► IP holders license as they wish for some amount of time, after which they commit not to assert their patents.
► Thus, IP holders are compensated, buyers get access to standards, and adjudication is much easier.