An efficient ECC-based provably secure three-factor user authentication and key agreement protocol for wireless healthcare sensor networks

We first show the security limitations of a recent user authentication scheme proposed for wireless healthcare sensor networks. We then present a provably secure three-factor user authentication and key agreement protocol for wireless healthcare sensor networks. The proposed scheme supports functionality features, such as dynamic sensor node addition, password as well as biometrics update, smart card revocation along with other usual features required for user authentication in wireless sensor networks. Our scheme is shown to be secure through the rigorous formal security analysis under the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model and broadly-accepted Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic. Furthermore, the simulation through the widely-known Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool shows that our scheme is also secure. High security, and low communication and computation costs make our scheme more suitable for practical application in healthcare applications as compared to other related existing schemes.