کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7242721 | 1471623 | 2017 | 29 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Internal conflict, market uniformity, and transparency in price competition between teams
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
درگیری داخلی، یکپارچگی بازار و شفافیت رقابت قیمت بین تیم ها
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
سازمان های، تعارض، قوانین مشترک رقابت، ناهمگونی، شفافیت، آزمایشی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
The way profits are divided within successful teams imposes different degrees of internal conflict. We experimentally examine how the level of internal conflict, and whether such conflict is transparent to other teams, affects teams' ability to compete vis-Ã -vis each other, and, consequently, market outcomes. Participants took part in a repeated Bertrand duopoly game between three-player teams which had either the same or different levels of internal conflict (uniform vs. mixed). Profit division was either private-pay (high conflict; each member received her own asking price) or equal-pay (low conflict; profits were divided equally). We find that internal conflict leads to (tacit) coordination on high prices in uniform private-pay duopolies, but places private-pay teams at a competitive disadvantage in mixed duopolies. Competition is softened by transparency in uniform markets, but intensified in mixed markets. We propose an explanation of the results and discuss implications for managers and policy makers. (D43, L22, C92)
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 144, December 2017, Pages 121-132
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 144, December 2017, Pages 121-132
نویسندگان
Michael Kurschilgen, Alexander Morell, Ori Weisel,