کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7242991 | 1471646 | 2015 | 39 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Communication networks in common-pool resource games: Field experimental evidence
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
شبکه های ارتباطی در بازی های اشتراکی مشترک: شواهد تجربی میدان
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We explore the role of communication networks and message types on behavior in a common pool resource game. In an artefactual field experiment, we introduce two network structures allowing participants to transmit non-binding suggestions to the other players with whom they were connected. We study the effect of these networks on subjects' payoffs. In a centralized network, “bad” (self-regarding) suggestions have a negative and permanent effect, whereas “good” (cooperative) suggestions have a null (or even negative) effect due to their limited credibility. In a decentralized network the positive effect of “good” suggestions is permanent (although smaller than in the centralized network), while “bad” suggestions have a more limited effect. Although allocation to positions in the network is exogenous, we find a positive correlation between network centrality and other-regarding behavior when transmitting “good” and “bad” messages.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 118, October 2015, Pages 215-226
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 118, October 2015, Pages 215-226
نویسندگان
César Mantilla,