کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7243114 | 1471648 | 2015 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Collusion among many firms: The disciplinary power of targeted punishment
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
تقلب در میان بسیاری از شرکت ها: قدرت انضباطی مجازات هدف
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with and without the possibility of targeting punishment at specific market participants. In markets with two, four, six, and eight firms, we analyze to what extent targeted punishment helps firms to restrict output. We find that targeted punishment leads to more collusion across all markets. Furthermore, beyond two firms, this collusive effect turns out to be even stronger in markets with more competitors, suggesting a reversal of the conventional wisdom that collusion is easier with fewer firms.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 116, August 2015, Pages 83-93
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 116, August 2015, Pages 83-93
نویسندگان
Catherine Roux, Christian Thöni,