کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7243860 | 1471680 | 2011 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Why a clean politician supports dirty politics: A game-theoretical explanation for the persistence of political corruption
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
⺠I show that when political competition is among a small set of career politicians with no term limits, political corruption produces a positive externality for the clean politician as well. ⺠Studying an infinitely repeated political duopoly, I identify the set of parameters under each politicians promises are credible, and then the subset under which neither politician promises the reform in a Nash Equilibrium. ⺠Compared to a (legal) rent-maximizer, a policy-motivated politician has stronger incentives to adopt the reform when the level of corruption is low; but, when the level of corruption is high, he too, will choose not to adopt the reform when the corrupt one did not adopt it.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 80, Issue 3, December 2011, Pages 498-510
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 80, Issue 3, December 2011, Pages 498-510
نویسندگان
Haldun Evrenk,