کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7355846 | 1478044 | 2018 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Plea bargaining with multiple defendants and its deterrence effect
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
معامله جناحی با متهمان متعدد و اثر بازدارنده آن
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
This article analyzes a model of plea bargaining with multiple co-defendants. We characterize equilibrium as separating or pooling, depending on the relative importance of type-I and type-II errors. Effects of plea bargaining on criminal incentives are examined in an extended model. Contrary to the widespread perception of being “soft” on crime by weakening deterrence, we show that plea bargaining unambiguously reduces crime. The benefit of improved informational efficiency more than offsets the crime-incentivizing effect of offering discounted sentences to defendants who plea bargain. Plea bargaining is therefore socially efficient whenever the risk of wrongfully convicting innocent defendants is sufficiently small.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 55, September 2018, Pages 58-70
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 55, September 2018, Pages 58-70
نویسندگان
Nathan Berg, Jeong-Yoo Kim,