Bondage by contract in the late Roman empire

Legal codes and other documents of the late Roman Empire reveal a system, the colonate or sometimes (redundantly) the bound colonate in which farmers (coloni) had their (head and land) taxes paid by estate owners in whose census rolls they were registered. If the land changed ownership coloni were entitled to stay and were registered in the tax roll of the new owner. However, coloni and their offspring lacked the right to migrate. Developing some previously advanced ideas about patrocinium “patronage,” this article argues that the pristine or original form of the colonate is a voluntary contractual arrangement among free farmers, estate owners, and the imperial Fiscus which acquired a public law dimension because it required a change in the personal status of the farmer. By means of this bondage contract the contractors expected to share in the aggregate gains from reducing tax-collection costs and from stabilizing tax revenues. The paper goes on to consider the implications of the colonate for economic efficiency and concludes with some observations on the reasons for changes over time in its importance.