کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7370084 | 1479435 | 2015 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Optimal disability insurance with unobservable skill heterogeneity
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
بیمه معلولیت بهینه با ناهمگنی مهارت غیر قابل مشاهده
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کلمات کلیدی
بیمه معلولیت، مالیات بر درآمد، امنیت اجتماعی،
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies the U.S. income tax and disability insurance systems in a unified framework with relevant private information and a general social welfare function. To that end, I develop a dynamic model in which agents differ in labor productivity and disability status, which are both private information. The optimal allocation can exhibit negative marginal labor income tax rates for high-skilled individuals but zero for low-skilled individuals, which is contrary to standard results. Also, I find that a reform to the optimal system in the calibrated model would significantly improve the U.S. system. The welfare gains amount to a 3.48 percent increase in consumption with a utilitarian social welfare function, which might be larger with a non-utilitarian function. Better insurance for people in bad states and reduced intratemporal distortions account for almost all the welfare gains. However, intertemporal distortions do not appear to play a major role.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 122, February 2015, Pages 94-109
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 122, February 2015, Pages 94-109
نویسندگان
Kyung-woo Lee,